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RESTRICTIONS ON GIFTS FOR RELIGIOUS
OR CHARITABLE USES
By
RAYMOND M. REMICK*
Collaborating With
A. J. WHITE HUTTONt
Since April 26, 18551 gifts for religious or charitable uses, whether by Deed
or Will, have been subject to certain statutory restrictions. The reason for these
dates back prior to the Middle Ages.
"Charities had their origin in the great command, to
love thy neighbor as thyself. But when the Emperor Constantine permitted his subjects to bequeath their property to the
church, it was soon abused; so much so, that afterwards, when
it became too common to give land to religious uses, consistently with the free circulation of property, the supreme authority of every nation in Europe, where Christianity prevailed,
found it necessary to limit such devises by statutes of mortmain.
"In France, by the ancient constitutions of that Kingdom,
churches, communities, chapters, colleges, convents, &c., were
not permitted to acquire or hold immovable property. Dumoulin sur, 1st art., 51 De la Cou., Paris. This incapacity
after a long time was relaxed, and they were allowed to hold,
by license of the King.
"In Spain, the communities mentioned before could
neither acquire nor hold property, unless by authority of the
sovereign; but in England, corporations had the capacity to
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take property by the common law. Co. Litt., 99. They were
rendered incapable of purchasing without the King's license
by a succession of statutes from Magna Charta, 9 Henry III.
to 9 Geo. II.
"They are known as the Statutes of Mortmain; that is,
as it was the privilege of anyone, before such statute restrained
it, to leave his property of every ktnd by testament to whom he
pleased, and for such purposes, charitable or otherwise, as he
chose; and the will was, in every particular, admiriistered according to the testator's intentions, sometimes by the courts
of common law, and at others by a court in chancery, as may
be seen from
the cases in Duke and other writers upon
2
charities."
Our own Acts of Assembly stem from the Act of 9 Geo. 2, c. 36, properly
known as the Charitable Uses Act, passed by Parliament in 1735. 3
That Act by its terms excluded "any estate, real or personal, lying or being
within that part of Great Britain called Scotland", and its provisions "were never
in England supposed to have been made to extend to her colonies and were
never in force in those in America which became independent states, except
by legislative adoption." 4 Hence provisions similar to those of that Act were
never in effect in Pennsylvania until, in 1855, a statute was passed' reading
as follows:
"No estate, real or personal, shall hereafter be bequeathed, devised, or conveyed to any body politic, or to any
person, in trust for religious or charitable uses except the same
be done by deed or will, attested by two credible, and at the
time, disinterested witnesses, at least one calendar month before the decease of the testator or alienor; and all dispositions
of property contrary hereto, shall be void, and go to the
residuary legatee or devisee, next of kin, or heirs, according to
law; Provided, That any disposition of property within said
period, bona fide made for a valuable consideration, shall not
be hereby avoided."
2

From the opinion of Mr. Justice Wayne in Perrin vs. Carey, 65 U. S. (16 L. Ed.) 701, 24 How.
465, a case which arose in 1861 in Ohio under a bill in equity to set aside devises and bequests under the Will of Charles McMicken to the City of Cincinnati in trust for the foundation and maintenance of two colleges.
3As observed in 2 Chitty, page 34, this Act was commonly but erroneously termed the "Mortmain
Act" and was wholly repealed except as to Section 5 by *the later Mortmain and Charitable
Uses Act of 1888. It provided, inter alia, that a gift should be invalid:
"in trust or for the benefit of any charitable uses whatsoever, unless such gift
- -.
be and be made by deed indented, sealed and delivered in the presence
of two or more cerdible witnesses, twelve calendar months at least before the
death of such donor or grantor."
As noted in Jarman on Wills, (5th Edition by Bigelow) page 232: "Never, indeed, was the
spirit of any legislative enactment more vigorously and zealously seconded by the judicature,
than" this statute.
410 American Jurisprudence page 615, and Perrin vs. Carey, supra,
5Act of April 26, 1855, P. L. 332, Section 11.
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Scarcely had the ink become dry on this piece of legislation, when in 1857
the matter came before our Supreme Court for its decision. There 6 it appeared
that one Thomas Smith had on April 10, 1856 made his Will by which he bequeathed and devised certain property in trust for "the uses and purposes of
Friends Boarding School at Westtown, etc.", and died twenty days later, or in
other words less than one calendar month after the making of his Will. The
real point involved in that case was whether or not the gift was a devise for
a charitable use, and in passing upon this point Mr. Chief Justice Lewis, after
quoting the Act of 1855, went on to say:
"In the spirit of the statute of 9 Geo. 2d, ch. 36 and to
prevent many of the mischiefs remedied by that statute, the
Act of 26th April, 1855, was passed. There may be some
difference of opinion on the question of policy involved in its
enactment; but there can be no doubt that it is our duty to
carry out its provisions in good faith."

It is the "difference of opinion on the question of policy involved" in such an
enactment that has impelled a consideration of the subject by the writer.
Under certain of the decisions 7 following the passage of this Act
"it was held that if the attesting witness be interested as

legatee or devisee under the will, or is to derive a pecuniary
benefit or advantage from any part of it, or if interested at the
time of attestation in a religious or charitable institution
named as beneficiary, he is not disinterested within the meaning of the statute. Under the authority of this case, and those
which followed and broadened its scope, All gifts to charitable
uses were held invalid if the subscribing witness had such an
interest under any of the provisions of the will as to disqualify
him from attesting the execution of the entire testamentary
writing. All gifts to charities fell if the subscribing witness
was disqualified from attesting the execution of the will." 8
The situation thus created was very quickly corrected by the Legislature
which 9 interpolated the provision that:
"a disinterested witness being a witness not interested in such
religious or charitable use, this act not being intended to apply
to a witness interested in some other devise, bequest, or gift
in the same instrument."

Despite the apparent clearness of this provision, within less than four years
the matter had reached our Supreme Court

0

where Mr. Justice Elkins said:

"It would be difficult to conceive of a clearer and more
direct expression of legislative intention. Hereafter the inter6

1n Price v. Maxwell, 28 Pa. 23.
.See particularly Kessler's Est., 221 Pa. 314 (1908).
Ssee Palethorp's Est., 249 Pa. 411, 413 et seq.

9By the Act of June 7, 1911, P. L. 702.
1OPalethorp's Est., 249 Pa. 411, 414 (1915).
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est which disqualifies an attesting witness to a will in cases
of this character, is an interest in the religious or charitable
use. An interest in a devise, or bequest, or gift in the same
instrument, does not disqualify an attesting witness because
the legislature has so declared, and it is a subject clearly within
the domain of legislative power. This means that when the
execution of a will has been attested by two credible witnesses,
all devises, bequests and gifts, except those in which the attesting witness has an interest, are to be held valid under the
Act of 1911."
So the matter stood until the Commission appointed on October 4, 191511
"to codify and revise the laws of decedents' estates" filed with the Legislature
their recommendation that Section 6 of the new Wills Act 12 should provide:
"No estate, real or personal, shall be bequeathed or
devised to any body politic, or to any person in trust, for religious or charitable uses, except the same be done by will attested by two credible, and, at the time, disinterested witnesses,
at least thirty days before the decease of the testator; and all
dispositions of property contrary hereto shall be void, and
go to the residuary legatee or devisee, heirs or next of kin,
according to law. A disinterested witness, within the meaning
of this section, is a witness not interested in such religious or
charitable use, this section not being intended to apply to a
witness interested in some other devise or bequest in the
same instrument."
The Commissioners comment in their report 13 that:

"Much might perhaps be said in favor of the abolition of
the prohibition of bequests and devises for charitable and
religious uses made within any definite period of time before
the death of the testator. The Commissioners have concluded
to make no recommendation on this subject to the Legislature.
They have, however, substituted for the period of one calendar
month, that of thirty days, for the reason that the calendar
months of the year do not contain the same number of days,
and the provision should be uniform."
Strangely enough, however, it was not this apprehension on the part of
the Commissioners as to a possible desire to abolish the definite period of time
fixed by the Act, but rather on the contrary the necessity for two credible witnesses that excited the interest of the Legislature in the possibility of amending
the Act on this point. Such procedure was proposed in the Session of 1935 and
met with but little opposition.
The result was the passage of the Act of July 2, 1935, P. L. 573, which
deleted from the statute all reference to witnesses. There still remained the proliBy the Act of April 23, 1915, P. L. 177.
2
18 That of June 7, 1917, P. L. 403.
1 Page 62.
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vision for the lapse of a certain length of time. "Thirty days" seems a simple
enough sort of an expression, but the reported decisions indicated such uncertainty, real or assumed, in the litigation that arose on the subject that the Legis.
lature 4 inserted a clause providing: "which period shall be so computed as to
exclude the first and include the last day thereof." Since the date of this Act
the matter has been governed by the provision providing as follows:
"No estate, real or personal, shall be bequeathed or devised to any body politic, or to any person in trust for religious
or charitable uses, except the same be done by will at least
thirty days before the decease of the testator, which period
shall be so computed as to exclude the first and to include the
last day thereof; and all dispositions of property contrary
hereto shall be void and go to the residuary legatee or devisee,
heirs or next of kin, according to law."
In the Wills Act of

194715

there is a provision 16 that:

"Any bequest or devise for religious or charitable purposes included in a will or codicil executed within thirty days
of the death of the testator shall be invalid unless all who
would benefit by its invalidity agree that it shall be valid.
The thirty-day period shall be so computed as to include the
day on which the will or codicil is written and to exclude
the day of death. Unless the testator directs otherwise, if such
a will or codicil shall revoke or supersede a prior will, or
codicil executed at least thirty days before the testator's death,
and not theretofore revoked or superseded and the original
of which can be produced in legible condition, and if each instrument shall contain an identical gift for substantially the
same religious or charitable use, the gift in the later will or
codicil shall be valid; or if each instrument shall give for substantially the same religious or charitable purpose a cash legacy
or a share of the residuary estate or a share of the same asset,
payable immediately or subject to identical prior estates and
conditions, the later gift shall be valid to the extent to which
it shall not exceed the prior gift.
and in adverting to the time limitation, the stringent provisions of which are
somewhat ameliorated to the extent above set forth, the Commissioners in their
report said (page 10) :
"This subsection takes care of the situation where a
testator has been charitably inclined and then changes his will

in some respect within thirty days of death. The present un4

1 By Act No. 71 of May 16, 1939, P. L. 141. The Act relating to gifts for religious or charitable
uses by a deed inter vivos remained in effect until the Act of May 16, 1939, P. L. 141 (No.
70).
5
16 Approved by the Governor April 24, 1947, No. 38.
1 Under Section 4 relating to under what circumstances wills shall be modified.
The final clause of the Act to a large extent embodies the rule of law illustrated by the opinion of the court in Bingaman's Est., 281 Pa. 497.
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fortunate situation is illustrated by Hartman's Est., 320 Pa.
321. The rule of Section 6 of the Wills Act of 1917 is considered sound, and it is believed the proposed subsection in
avoiding certain inequitable situations does not weaken the
effectiveness of the rule forbidding last minute 'charitable'
and 'religious' influences. When the devise or bequest for
religious or charitable purposes remains the same in the earlier
andlater will there should be no difficulty in applying the
proviso-the later charitable gift will be good."
Up to the time of this writing, this is the last word by the Legislature on
the subject.
The Wills Act of 1947 in the provision quoted greatly improves the law
relative to charitable dispositions and these provisions will, it is hoped, more
effectually carry out the intention of testators, which has always been considered
as the pole-star to guide the courts.
In Hartman's Estate1 7 the drastic effort of the 30-day requirement was
illustrated, now happily changed by the new Act. Likewise the softening rules
adopted in Bingaman's Estate18 were properly extended, so it may be generally concluded that these provisions constitute an advance in the law of Wills.
However, the question occurs as to the propriety of the 30-day clause in
its retention in view of the elimination of the clause requiring attesting witnesses,
construed in Paxson's Estate 9 as subscribing witnesses, by the provisions of the
amending Act of 193520 and carried over into the Act of 1947.
Under the present state of the law and in view of the ruling in Schultz's
23
22
Appeal21 and affirmed in the later cases of Flood vs. Ryan and Bickley's Estate
and other methods of affording means of by-passing the 30-day requirement, a
reasonable doubt arises whether this time requirement has not lost its potency
as well as any sound reasons for its continuation in the law.
To refresh the memory of the gentle reader, it was decided in Schultz's
Appeal24 about 21 years after the passage of the Act of April 26, 1855 that the
30-day provision could be by-passed under the following statement of facts.
Schultz, the testator, being very ill sent for a scrivener to write his will and the
same was drawn and executed September 6, 1872, the testator dying September
13, 1872. He had expressed a desire to leave, the bulk of his estate to religious
charities but the scrivener advised that the will would be inoperative as to such
17320 Pa. 321 (1936), 182 A. 234.
18281 Pa. 497 (1924), 127 A. 73.
19221 Pa. 98 (1908), 70 A. 280.
2
gAct of July 2, 1935, P. L. 573.
2180 Pa. 396 (1876).
22220 Pa. 450 (1908), 69 A. 908.
28270 Pa. 101 (1921), 113 A. 68.
24

Note 21, supra.
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bequests if the testator died within the 30 days as he actually did. A suggestion was made that he could dispose of his estate by will unconditionally to
someone and if the latter would see fit he could apply the estate to the purposes
the testator had wanted. After this scheme was thoroughly explaned the testator
concluded to make a bishop of his church as the residuary legatee absolutely.
The bishop did not know of this arrangement, had no part in it, and learned
the facts after the testator's death. Whereupon he signified his intention to carry
out the testator's wishes, although he was advised that under the terms of the
will the residuary estate was his absolutely. The balance of the estate for distribution amounted to something over ten thousand dollars and the auditor
awarded the fund to the bishop holding the gift absolute unimpressed with any
trust and that the bishop was not bound by any assurances given testator that he
could be trusted to carry out his wishes, not having been a party in any way to
such arrangement. The Orphans' Court overruled the exceptions to the auditor's
report and entered a decree which later was assigned for error to the Supreme
Court. In affirming the decree and dismissing the appeal, Sharswood, J. thus
concluded:
"It is urged, however, that this whole plan is nothing but
a contrivance to evade the statute. No doubt such was the
intention of the testator. It is said that it is a fraud upon the
law and that the bequest ought therefore to be declared void.
But that overlooks the fact that the absolute property in the
subject of this bequest has vested in the legatee, and that he
is entirely innocent of any complicity in the fraud of the
testator. If the statute is practically repealed by this construction it is evident that it must be for the legislature to devise
and apply a remedy, not the judiciary, whose province is not
jus dare but jus diceri."
This reasoning, characterized by one writer as "legalistic casuistry'2
followed in Flood vs. Ryan

26

27

and in Bickley's Estate,

6

was

not however without strong

dissenting opinions in both, in the former by Mestrezat, J., and in the latter by
Simpson, J. Justice Simpson delivered an extremely caustic criticism of the
reasoning of Schultz's Appeal and the cases following, outlining his dissertation
into five points, all of which are compelling and pertinent. This opinion is prefaced with the following statement: "If the question involved was an open one
with us, or if it was of modern determination, we would reverse the decree
in the present case for the following reasons."
Despite the animadversions made the principle of these cases has survived
and remains as law to this day, thus affording opportunities for evasion perpetrated by the testator as in the cases cited upon innocent persons who are im25

Execution of Wills, 47 Dick. L. R. 83 (1943), Hutton.
26See note 22 supra.
27
See note 23 supra.
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pelled by a high sense of duty in carrying out the testator's wishes despite the
stringent terms of the statute. In Flood vs. Ryan28 the Archbishop testified that
although he was advised by counsel that the gift to him was an absolute and unconditional one, yet he was impelled to carry out the testator's wishes being bound
in the realm of conscience. On this particular aspect Mestrezat, J., in his dissenting opinion said:
"The question here, however, is not between a cestui que
trust and the trustee, nor does it involve the right of a cestui
que trust to enforce the provisions of a trust against a trustee.
The question is whether the devise to Archbishop Ryan was
in fact to him individually or to him as trustee for the church
and charity primarily given the property in the will, and therefore made to him individually to evade the Act of April 26,
1855, P. L. 328. . . . The will, therefore, read in the light
of these facts, shows conclusively that the residue of the
testator's property was devised to the Archbishop with the intention, and the devisee so understands that it shall be held
and used for the church and charity named in his will ...
The will itself shows the intention of the testator to give the
residue of his property to the church and charity named in his
will. The Archbishop, the devisee, admits that he holds the
property for such uses. Under his admission Archbishop Ryan
would commit a fraud if he applied the property to his own
use and withheld it from the church and charity. His integrity
and high character are a positive assurance that he will not
betray the trust reposed in him. The church and charity,
testator, in
therefore, get the property, as intended by the
29
plain violation of the laws of Pennsylvania."As subscribing witnesses have been eliminated in the matter of charitable
gifts by will, there are no safeguards against an evasion of the requirement by
ante:dating a will, either in collusion with the scrivener or where a will is
holographic, and therefore the exclusive work of the testator. In these several
methods of evasion the situation can be presented in the form of this question.
Why put an honest scrivener to such subterfuges as in Schultz's Appeal.
Flood vs. Ryan, and Bickley's Estate, or tempt a dishonest scrivener to travel in
even more devious paths?
The purpose of the 30-day provision was to preclude deathbed dispositions
wherein it might be obvious that unscrupulous persons or those with an overweening zeal for the particular cause might impose their wills upon the testator
rather than the free and voluntary expression of the testator himself.
This aspect of so-called "deathbed wills" was very recently before the
Supreme Court 0 where the will of a man who died about twenty-four hours
28

See note 22 supra.
29Cf. Honorary Trusts in Pennsylvania, 42 Dick. L. R. 161 (1938).
BOKlingner vs. Dugacki, 356 Pa. 143 (1947), 51 A. 2d. 627.
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after his will was executed was set aside inter alia on the ground that the decedent did not possess testamentary capacity as found by the jury and the court
below, and Mr. Justice Allen M. Stearne, who wrote the opinion for the court,
called attention to the fact that:
"As early as 1612 Coke said: 'Few men pinched with the
messengers of death have a disposing memory': 10 Rep. Pref.
XIV.,,
Thus the matter stands, though the considered opinion of many learned
jurists, some of which have been referred to hereinbefore, has differed materially
on the wisdom of retaining either the credible witness clause, which 1has been
eliminated, or the thirty-day clause which has been retained, or both.3
To the writer there seems to be some doubt as to whether or not the situation
as it existed at the time of Constantine and later during the reign of George II,
and in this Commonwealth in 1855, has not materially changed.
In England, in the early part of the Eighteenth Century, and back prior thereto at least to the time of Magna Carta when one referred to a charitable use but
one institution was meant-The Church, and in such case not, as today any one
of scores of denominations, but that having its sole source of authority in Rome.
Today, on the other hand, there is scarcely a limit to those institutions, conceived by the mind of man in its most unselfish manifestations, which are conducive to the alleviation of mortal ills and misfortunes, the relief of the poor
and needy, the healing of the sick and distressed, as well as those incident solely
to religion or education. But a negligible few of the gifts for such purposes
can be imputed to overweening influence on a mind clouded by approaching death
and bent on a belated ransom.
Where such is the purpose that impelled the gift and such the condition of
the testator, our law has adequate relief in the decisions relating to testamentary
capacity, undue influence and confidential relationship.
Every active practitioner within the Commonwealth has experienced cases
where a splendid charitable gift by one of unquestioned lucidity and completely
free from any influence has been thwarted by an unexpected death within thirty
days. In many more they have shuddered at the thought of what might have
been had the testator not survived this purely arbitrary period of time.
In 1855 railroads were in their infancy. Airplanes and automobiles were
undreamt of. Life was leisurely and death normally the result of illness or old
age. Times have changed. Should the law change with them?
SISee McLean vs. Wade, 41 Pa. 266, 269 (1861) ; Gray's Est., 147 Pa. 67, 76 (1892) ; Paxson's
Est., 221 Pa. 98, 107, 111 (1908). For a digest on the laws of this and other states relation
to the subject see the Supplement to the Law of Wills published with the Second Edition
of Thompson on Wills, Sections 595-647.
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Charities are, or at least should be, favorites of the law, at least up
tain pointY2 The law protects a surviving spouse as against a will which
unduly in his or her opinion for a charitable use. No such protection
to the decedent's children and perhaps this would be a wise matter for
islature to consider.33

to a cerprovides
is given
the Leg-

There should certainly be no encouragement given to "undue influence."
The evil which is attempted to be remedied by the Statute being obvious, in
the opinion of the writer such could be prevented better and with less injury to
the reasoned desires of a testator by the inclusion of the credible witness clause
or some modification thereof, rather than the persistence of the thirty day clause.
If the thirty day clause is repealed the principle of Schultz's Appeal, et al,
passes out. If instead of this provision the credible witness requirement is restored, the fear of imposition upon the testator is safeguarded, it is believed, sufficiently. If the trend of the law and economic events is followed, the thirty day
clause in the present law might be repealed as was the credible witness requirement in 1935, thus leaving the testator unhampered by either requirement.
April 30, 1947. '

2
S
1 Note the fact that under the Federal Estate Tax Act most gifts for charity are exempt from tax.
SFor law of other states relative to limitation of amount based on the proportion of tha estate
particularly applying where testator leaves lineal descendants as in Idaho, or spouse, child,
grandchildren or parent as in Iowa, or spouse, child or parent as in New York, see Atkinson,
Law of Wills (Hornbook Series 1937) page 108 et seq.

